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 Abstract  
This study examines India and Turkey as case studies relevant to the Senlis Council’s 
‘poppies for medicine’ proposal. The proposal is that Afghan farmers are licensed to produce 
opium for medical and scientific purposes. Here it is posited that the Senlis proposal neglects 
at least three key lessons from the Turkish and Indian experiences. First, not enough weight 
has been given to diversion from licit markets, as experienced in India. Second, both India 
and Turkey had significantly more efficient state institutions with authority over the licensed 
growing areas. Third, the proposal appears to overlook the fact that Turkey’s successful 
transition was largely due to the use of the poppy straw method of opium production. It is 
concluded that, while innovative and creative policy proposals such as that of the Senlis 
proposal are required if Afghanistan is to move beyond its present problems, ‘poppies for 
medicine’ does not withstand evidence-based scrutiny.  
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The 1961 United Nations (UN) Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (United Nations, 1961) 
restricts the use and production of opium to medical and scientific purposes. All other efforts 
to produce opium are illicit. The Single Convention additionally provides a monitoring 
framework which ensures that the legal production of opium remains highly regulated. State 
narcotics boards must not only take stringent measures to monitor and control opium 
production but are subject to monitoring by the International Narcotics Control Board 
(INCB), and thereby accountable to the international community. In practice this means that a 
country cannot simply start producing opium for medical and scientific purposes, but must 
have the approval of the international community. It can only obtain that approval via INCB 
and the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), the international bodies 
which promote the integrity of the legal drug trade and coordinate efforts to tackle the illegal 
trade. A national-level proposal that convinces the member states of CND and the appointed 
board members of the INCB must be watertight. 
Since 2005, the Senlis Council (now renamed the International Council on Security 
and Development) have lobbied governments and inter-governmental bodies to support its 
proposal for a ‘poppies for medicine’ industry in Afghanistan.1 In brief, the proposal is that 
the government of Afghanistan should license some farmers to cultivate opium poppies from 
which the state produces medicinal morphine to sell to third-world nations at a lower price 
than in current markets (Bhattacharji and Kamminga, 2010; Van Ham and Kamminga, 2007). 
It is currently proposing the implementation of a pilot project to analyze outcomes and 
inadvertent consequences (Kamminga, 2011). Creative and innovative proposals such as this 
are to be welcomed as the illicit opium trade has become one of the biggest risks to 
Afghanistan’s economic and political stability. However, the Senlis proposal for Afghanistan 
warrants scrutiny not least because of the potential ramifications for international opium and 
heroin markets, both licit and illicit, but also because of the potential implications for 
Afghanistan as a nation state. It is the need to ensure that any benefits of legal opium 
production must clearly outweigh any potential costs and risks in the context of a new and 
fragile democracy, which motivated the present study. 
                                                           
1
 For the Senlis media campaign between 2008 and mid-2011 please search Paul Burton, Norine 
MacDonald and Jorrit Kamminga on Nexis-Lexis to access the numerous interviews with high-profile 
western media such as The Times, the Washington Times and The International Tribune Herald. 
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The ‘poppies for medicine’ proposal is supported by two case studies of the Indian and 
Turkish regimes. The basis of this paper is a critical analysis of these two pieces of research. 
By drawing upon a review of these regimes, it is suggested that the Senlis proposal neglects 
at least three key lessons from these experiences. First, not enough weight has been given to 
diversion from licit markets as experienced in India. Second, both India and Turkey had, and 
have, significantly more efficient state institutions with authority over the licensed growing 
areas. Third, the proposal appears to overlook the fact that Turkey’s successful transition was 
largely due to the use of the poppy straw method of opium production. 
The lessons from India and Turkey must be envisaged in the Afghan context. Here, the 
extremely-fragile nature of the Afghan nation-state and the lack of the rule of law are key 
factors. The authority of the Afghan state is weak in poppy-growing areas; corruption is 
endemic to most Afghan institutions including the administration of criminal justice which is 
also significantly under-resourced. Further, the country lacks the transport infrastructure 
required for a licit opium industry and there is the possibility that licensed opium production 
would affect only a small percentage of Afghans and generate resentment elsewhere. 
Consequently, based upon the analyses of experience in India and Turkey it is concluded that 
Afghanistan is not presently in a position to undertake a ‘poppies for medicine’ regime. 
To set the scene, the next section outlines the Senlis ‘poppies for medicine’ proposal 
and summarizes some critiques already expressed by policy analysts. This is followed by 
background information on, then analysis of, the Indian and Turkish licit opium industries 
and their use as case studies in support of the Senlis proposal. A review of some 
inefficiencies of the Afghan state which would act as a barrier to implementation of the plan 
is then undertaken. The concluding section draws together the various strands of evidence in 
order to assess the likelihood for success of the ‘poppies for medicine’ proposal. 
Overview of the ‘Poppies for Medicine’ Proposal 
The Senlis Council (2007) published the ‘poppies for medicine’ proposal in 2005. In the 
proposal the Afghan state would license village groups to cultivate opium poppies and 
process the extracted opium into morphine tablets, from which the state would produce 
medicine for domestic or foreign redistribution. Once licensed a village Shura2 would 
                                                           
2
 The Shura is a traditional dispute resolution mechanism operating in Afghanistan in which a council 
of elders interpret customary and Islamic laws passed down through generations. The Shura is found 
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allocate jobs within the village. Farmers, farm labourers, security guards, laboratory 
technicians and administrators would be hired and, if required, trained. The Shura would 
monitor and record the process by first estimating the amount of produce each farmer should 
yield from their land and then monitoring compliance with this estimation. If a farmer fails to 
produce the promised yield at harvest, without satisfactory explanation, this would indicate 
diversion. Any evidence of diversion by one village member would result in the rescission of 
the village license and possible criminal prosecution by the state and/or Shura against the 
individual. 
The Afghan National Police (ANP) would partner villagers in protecting their produce 
from external threats during cultivation, storage and transit. International development 
organizations would monitor the quality of produce. The Shura would be required to allocate 
an undefined percentage of all profits to the development of the village, in an attempt to 
diversify economic activity, with a long-term goal of ‘phasing out’ licit and illicit poppy 
cultivation. International development organizations would advise on strategic spending. The 
two primary objectives of the proposal are to reduce illicit opium production within 
Afghanistan and supply more affordable opiate-based painkillers to less-developed nations, in 
which there is a deficit of affordable opiate-based painkillers. 
The proposal for legal opium production in Afghanistan garnered a mixture of support 
and criticism (see, e.g., Attaran and Boozary, 2011; Fawthrop, 2005; The Lancet, 2005; 
Polanyi, 2006; Tanter, 2011)3 from politicians, the media and academics. Policy analyst 
critiques have been based upon five general themes which shall be briefly summarized here 
(see Bhattacharji and Kamminga, 2010, for a defence of the criticisms). First, while around 
90% of global medicinal opiates are consumed in North America and Europe, this reflects not 
a deficit of supply, as Senlis suggest, but rather inadequate access and demand from 
developing nations (Chouvy, 2008; Grare, 2008; INCB, 2008). Second, Afghan opium would 
have to compete with existing licit producers such as Australia, India and Turkey. Third, the 
initiation of such a project in the more secure areas of Afghanistan would likely cultivate 
resentment within the less secure areas, where poppy cultivation is at its highest. Fourth, licit 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
within areas dominated by Hazara, Tajiks and Uzbecks. Similar mechanisms exist in Pashtun areas 
referred to as a Jirga. See Wardak, 2006. 
3
 For links to support for the proposal from western political parties and government committees see 
http://www.senliscouncil.net/modules/P4M/support 
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opium cultivation is not a developmental panacea; the likely licit income would be lower than 
the current illicit income (Chouvy, 2008). Last, the Afghan state is not prepared for a 
‘poppies for medicine’ industry. There is large scale conflict, instability, corruption and 
inefficiencies within the criminal justice and bureaucratic system (Felbab-Brown, 2007). 
Most importantly, Zulmay Afzali (2008), a spokesperson for the Afghan Ministry of 
Counter Narcotics, has agreed with many of these critiques stating that, if a global deficit did 
exist, then the major licit producers would have already filled it. The challenges of regulating 
opium production in insecure areas is also acknowledged, as is the potential for the proposal 
to increase conflict, stating that licensing a small number while eradicating the remainder of 
farmers’ crops would be an invitation to a return to civil war. 
It is not the intention of this paper to re-assess or reiterate these issues; however, some 
overlap is inevitable. Rather, it intends to evaluate the use of India and Turkey by Senlis as 
case studies in support of the overall proposal. 
An Introduction to the Indian and Turkish Opium Trades  
India and Turkey have long histories of supplying the market for both licit and illicit opium. 
Opium production in India was constrained, to a point, by strong bureaucratic and criminal 
justice mechanisms from 1799 onwards. The control process has improved its administrative 
and technological efficiency yet continues with the basic structure established in 1799. 
Unlicensed opium farming was prohibited and subject to stringent punishment. Opium poppy 
farmers were licensed to farm, and produce an amount demanded by, and sold only to, the 
state, at a fixed price. At the end of each season, the farmers transported produce to state 
opium agents for weighing and examination for adulterants. The opium would then be 
transported under armed guard to opium refining factories (Newman, 1989; Richards, 1981; 
Windle, 2011). 
Until 1936, the Indian export controls were often weak, sometimes deliberately so, 
resulting in opium being smuggled into countries which prohibited its importation, most 
notably China (Haq, 2000). The export controls currently conform to international regulations 
imposed by the Single Convention. 
Turkish opium suffered similarly weak export controls and supplied large illicit 
markets. However, Turkey never benefitted from the regulatory controls that had been 
Windle, J. (2011). ‘Poppies for Medicine in Afghanistan: Historical Lessons from India and Turkey’. 
Journal of Asian and African Studies. Vol. 46(6), pp. 663-677. Pre-print copy. 
 
6 
 
implemented in India by the British during colonial rule (Poroy, 1981). This meant that, until 
the early 1970s, Turkish opium was one of the primary sources for the global illicit opium 
and heroin markets (Bulletin of Narcotics, 1953; INCB, 1971; Murphy and Steele, 1971; 
West, 1992). In response to international pressure, particularly from the United States (US), 
the government of Turkey first banned opium cultivation in 1971. The prohibition was 
dropped in 1974 in favour of a strict licensed control system, based upon the manufacture of 
poppy straw (Brundage and Mitchell, 1977; Spain, 1975). 
As illustrated in Figure 1, since the 1980s India and Turkey have consistently been two 
of the leading suppliers of medicinal and scientific opium to the global market. India, during 
the 1970s exerted a near monopoly on the licit opium market (Haq, 2000). 
Figure One 
Global opium production in morphine equivalent
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Lessons from India 
From 1996 to 2001, Romesh Bhattacharji was Narcotics Commissioner of the Indian Central 
Bureau of Narcotics (CBN), the government department which controls and overseas the licit 
opium trade. In 2007 he published a report with the Senlis Council titled India’s Experiences 
in Licensing Poppy Cultivation for the Production of Essential Medicines (Bhattacharji, 
2007). The report argued that the experience of India’s involvement in the licit trade in 
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medicinal and scientific opium lent support to the Senlis ‘poppies for medicine’ proposal for 
Afghanistan. Bhattacharji had conducted field research in Afghanistan to complement his 
extensive experience with the Indian opium trade. However, the report was based solely on 
his personal knowledge and experience. That is, it lacked a foundation in the relevant 
literature and knowledge base, and consequently it overlooked some fundamental criticisms 
and issues relating to the mechanisms for the control of licit opium production. Chief 
amongst these is the issue of the diversion of opium from licit channels. 
Diversion 
‘Diversion’ is the rather innocuous-sounding technical term by which drug policy refers to 
theft. Diversion of licit opium in India is as old as the trade itself and was documented during 
colonial times (Watt, 1908; Windle, 2011). Yet arguably a significant weakness of the 
Bhattacharji/Senlis report, and the overall Senlis proposal for Afghanistan, is the lack of 
attention paid to diversion from the licit Indian trade to the black market. Precise national-
level estimates of the diversion rate are largely conspicuous by their absence (Mansfield, 
2001; US State Department, 2009). Nonetheless, many academic and government researchers 
have produced educated estimates. These have ranged from 10% in the mid-1980s (National 
Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), 1981, 1988), and 6–7% (INCB, 
1993), 25% (Laurent et al., 1996), and upwards of 50% (Haq, 2000) in the 1990s. Estimates 
in the first decade of the 21st century range from between 10% (US State Department, 2008)4 
and 30% (Mansfield, 2001).5 Foreign diplomats stationed in India have suggested that the 
10% estimate is too conservative (Paoli et al., 2009). 
Bhattacharji acknowledges diversion at around 20%, illustrating his point with an 
example of the Indian province of Uttar Pradesh were some licensed farmers were able to 
                                                           
4
 The US State Department reports diversion between 10 and 30%. No supporting evidence is 
published for this figure. 
5
 Paoli et al. (2009) mixed the high-end US State Department estimate of 30% (interviews with 
foreign diplomats stationed in India pointed to the lower-end being too conservative) with potential 
opium produced from reported ‘non-harvested’ opium poppy crops (i.e. when farmers report that they 
were unable to harvest their crops through poor weather conditions, strike action or such) to conclude 
an average diversion of 200 to 300 tonnes annually between 1996 and 2004. If these estimates were to 
be included in Figure 2 or Figure 3 then the line would fluctuate between levels higher than the 50% 
parameter and lower than the 30% parameter, but never as low as the 10% parameter. 
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cultivate poppies which produced almost double the opium yield per hectare of their 
neighbours (Bhattacharji, 2007). It is also worth noting that, if the yield was almost double 
then, for this example at least, the rate of diversion could be, by inference, close to 50%. 
However, even if ‘only’ 20% of opium is routinely diverted, this defines at least one 
parameter and limitation of the Indian model. 
Higher diversion rate estimates were derived by the former Mandsaur Deputy 
Narcotics Commissioner, Karan Sharma, who conducted an experiment in 1994 to highlight 
how high the Minimum Qualifying Yield (MQY) should be set. The MQY is a measure of 
yield set annually by the CBN which specifies the minimum kilograms of opium per hectare 
which each licensee must deliver. If the MQY is not met then, with the implication being that 
the remainder was sold illegally, the farmer loses the right to secure licenses for opium 
farming. Sharma cultivated, on a model farm, 62kg of opium from one hectare, while the 
MQY, at that time, was 40kg per hectare. Sharma further claimed that careful and 
experienced farmers could produce as much as 100kg per hectare (Haq, 2000). 
After interviewing Indian nationals involved in the licit trade in 2001, David Mansfield 
(2001) similarly concluded that average yields of 60–65kgs can be obtained from one hectare, 
while 80–100kg is possible. These estimated yields suggest diversion rates – assuming that 
little over the MQY is surrendered to the state – of between 35 and 60%. 
A separate indicator of the extent of diversion from licit channels is that, since the mid-
1980s, significant numbers of heroin-processing laboratories have been detected in India 
(INCB, 1993; NCB, 1993), many within licensed opium poppy growing regions (Mansfield, 
2001; Paoli et al., 2009). 
Diversion in the Context of the Global Illicit Opium Traffic 
The methodological reasoning of many of the estimations expressed earlier is not evident. 
Some may be little more than expert opinion. In the absence of a definitive study of Indian 
diversion and, due to the uncertainty over the precise diversion rate, the amount of opium 
diverted from India’s licit production is here estimated using different diversion rate 
parameters. A ‘low’ diversion rate estimate of 10%, a ‘medium’ estimate of 30% and a ‘high’ 
estimate of 50% are used. 
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By employing these parameters further light can be shed on the Bhattacharji paper by 
placing the diversion of Indian opium in the context of the global illicit opium traffic. Figures 
2 and 3 show the amount of Indian opium diverted using these parameters and set against the 
backdrop of estimated illicit opium production in Afghanistan, Burma (Myanmar) and Laos, 
which, in the most recent decade, have been the three most significant source countries. 
Figure 3 suggests that, if India’s diversion rate has exceeded 10%, then its contribution to the 
illicit opium trade has often surpassed that of Laos. Put another way, India may well be the 
world’s third-ranked producer of illicit opium after Afghanistan and Myanmar. 
Figure Two 
Potential diverted Indian opium compared with illictly 
produced Afghan and Burmese opium
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Figure Three 
Potential diverted Indian licit opium compared with 
illicitly produced Laotian opium
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Viewed in a different context, the low estimate for Indian diversion in 2006 of 
34,487kg is higher than the amount seized that year in many western countries: the US seized 
1,725kg and Australian seized 65kg of heroin, equivalent to 17,250kg and 650kg of opium 
respectively. Seizures in Western Europe totalled 8,352kg of heroin or 83,520kg of opium 
equivalent (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2008) and, while higher 
than the ‘low’ estimate of Indian diversion derived here, this is significantly lower than the 
higher estimates. Put another way, current diversion from India probably outweighs a 
significant part of the global supply reduction effects of Western law enforcement (Windle, 
2011). 
Clearly the diversion rate will vary and is not constant – that is merely a simplifying 
assumption made here for illustrative purposes. For example, the contraction of the number 
of licensed opium farmers in India in the early 1990s may have resulted in diversion being 
closer to the higher diversion rate parameters (Burger, 1995). Conversely, technological 
advances in crop monitoring in the first decade of the 21st century, coupled with higher 
MQYs of the 1990s (US State Department, 2002, 2009) may have resulted in diversion 
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falling closer to the low diversion rate (Windle, 2011). That said, it is of note that the inability 
of the government of India to effectively measure diversion may itself illustrate the lack of 
control the state has over its licit industry. 
Lessons from Turkey 
Published by the Senlis Council in 2007, Jorrit Kamminga released The Political History of 
Turkey’s Opium Licensing System for the Production of Medicines: Lessons for Afghanistan 
(Kamminga, 2007). This was followed in 2011 by Opium Poppy Licensing in Turkey: A 
Model to solve Afghanistan’s Illegal Opium Economy? (Kamminga, 2011). The title is 
arguably somewhat of a misnomer. It does offer a political history of the opium licensing 
system. However, it does not appear to identify lessons for Afghanistan other than to point to 
the well-known fact that the US and UN supported Turkey in developing a licit industry from 
a sparsely regulated one. 
It is of note that Turkey’s licit opium industry almost certainly reduced the rate of 
diversion over time. From 1933 onwards, the government of Turkey had been increasing its 
regulatory control over the licit trade and attempting to prevent diversion. Up to 1971 the 
control system was based upon an ‘Opium Declaration System’. The government formed 
estimates of how much opium Turkey should be producing, based on anticipated demand and 
stock levels from the preceding growing season. Thereafter, the Ministry of Agriculture 
calculated how much land was required to produce this amount and how many provinces 
should be allowed to cultivate poppies. However, unlike the Indian licensing system, the 
farmer was not told how much to plant but was required to inform a village representative 
how much they were willing to plant and the expected yield. The estimates were passed to the 
Ministry of Agriculture. The farmer was then expected to maintain production at the self-
imposed level. A license acknowledging this was not required (Murphy and Steele, 1971). In 
short, therefore, the licit production of opium in Turkey was regulated before the 1971 ban, 
but the regulations were rather loose and, due to their generously flexible scope, left little 
requirement for enforcement but plenty of scope for diversion. 
Kamminga’s report does not give details of the mechanism by which the improvement 
in opium control was achieved after 1971 other than to note US and UN assistance. It was by 
the introduction of the poppy straw process for the production of licit opium. The production 
of opium from poppy straw is significantly different from that of poppy pods, and was 
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compatible with a ban upon the harvesting and collection of poppy gum from lanced opium 
poppy pods. Due to the nature of the poppy straw production process, outlined briefly here, 
there is far less opportunity for the diversion of opium. In the system introduced in Turkey in 
the 1970s, the poppy plant is cultivated in the same manner as elsewhere, whether India or 
Afghanistan. However, at harvest the farmer is prohibited from incising the poppy pods to 
collect the opium gum within. The state monitors growing fields to ensure that no pods have 
been incised. Farmers cut and crush the poppies instead of directly extracting the opium 
themselves. The crushed poppies represent the poppy straw which is then sold to the state. 
Using expensive technology that is not generally available, the morphine is extracted 
(Mansfield, 2001). 
Table One 
 Control of 
corruption 
(percentile rank) 
Rule of law 
(percentile 
rank) 
Regulatory 
control 
(percentile rank) 
Government 
effectiveness 
(percentile rank) 
Afghanistan 1 0.5 2.9 8.1 
India 47.3 56.2 46.1 57.3 
Turkey 59.4 53.3 59.7 63.5 
Source: World Bank. (2008). World Wide Governance Indicators. 
 
It is curious that Senlis uses the two case studies as illustrative modules and then 
ignores the findings of scholars who have noted that the Turkish module, due to its reliance 
on the poppy straw process, is the more effective at limiting diversion (Mansfield, 2001; 
West, 1992). An expression of Turkish success is that, from 1976 onwards, the International 
Narcotics Control Board, the quasi-judicial body which is mandated under the Single 
Convention to monitor the licit opiate trade, has consistently reported that no diversion has 
been reported to them, expressing their satisfaction with the Turkish poppy straw process. 
During and beyond the 1980s, the paragraph the INCB used to express these successes was 
replaced with concern over the use of Turkey as a trafficking route and location for heroin 
manufacturing. As Turkey has continued to prove its ability to prevent diversion the 
international community lessened the need to reward; minimal diversion became the norm. 
However, the Senlis proposal is based on the Indian experience and control measures to a 
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much greater extent. Of the two case studies, therefore, it would appear the less efficient has 
been chosen as the model for Afghanistan. 
The Relative Inefficiency of the Afghan State 
Bhattacharji and Kamminga’s discussions fail to acknowledge the significant differences in 
efficiency between India, Turkey and Afghanistan. An analysis of some key determinants 
from the World Bank World Governance Indicators (2008a) indicates the overall differences. 
As illustrated in Table 1, both Turkey and India are globally ranked within the middle 
percentiles for all indicators; Afghanistan is ranked amongst the least efficient nations in the 
world for all indicators. The percentile rankings for the four indicators place Afghanistan on a 
level with, or below, such states as Somalia, Burma (Myanmar), Eritrea and Turkmenistan. 
The protection of all levels of illicit activity by state employees is reported to be 
extremely high (Ghufran, 2007; Mansfield, 2007; Shaw, 2007). The ‘criminalization’ of the 
ANP has also been reported as a problem of epidemic proportions, with reports of extortion 
and robbery by officers (Windle and Farrell, 2010). Afghanistan has an existing, and is 
developing a more extensive, body of criminal and civil law that meets international 
standards. However, largely due to corruption, an inadequate pool of educated workers and 
resource inadequacies, there remains a huge void between the rights and procedures 
expressed under state law and the ability of the state to enforce them (Windle and Farrell, 
2010). 
Of great significance to the project is that the Afghanistan transport infrastructure is 
highly inadequate. Its system of roads is reported as amongst the worst in the world. It has no 
railway infrastructure and is landlocked, with over 2,000 kilometres to a sea port. Its air 
transport infrastructure is seen as too uncertain for many international air carriers (World 
Bank, 2008b). Further, there are many reports of insurgents, criminals and ANP officers 
robbing and extorting money from travellers on state highways, making many unusable (The 
Economist, 2008; Ghufran, 2007; US State Department, 2007). There does not seem to be a 
road, or other transport infrastructure, with the capacity to support an export-based industry 
where opium – a valuable commodity with inherent attractions for thieves – could be reliably 
transported from remote rural areas to processing factories and beyond for export or domestic 
re-distribution. 
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Further, both Turkey and India have long histories of relatively-efficient criminal 
justice and bureaucratic institutions. In India, the opium control system evolved with the 
evolving state system. In the 1970s, when Turkey strengthened its regulatory system, it 
already possessed a functioning state system. Conversely, Afghanistan is in the process of 
rebuilding after decades of violent conflict and institutional neglect. 
Further Analysis and Discussion 
The two case studies inform the overall ‘poppies for medicine’ proposal. This final section 
shall discuss the actual proposal as reported by Senlis Council (2007) and the relationship to 
the experiences of Turkey and India. 
In the proposal, the state would license villages under three conditions: (1) that 
alternative crops are unavailable; (2) that the community is committed to the suppression of 
trafficking; (3) that the community is committed to creating diverse economies. It is also 
noted that access to road networks and land suitable for high-quality poppy would also be 
required. 
The report fails to mention the level of security in the areas. Both India and Turkey 
prohibited cultivation in areas in which the state could not exert effective control: neither 
Bhattacharji nor Kamminga signify the importance of these measures. India de-licensed 
Himachal Pradesh in 1954–5 (Deshaprabhu, 1966) and Turkey prohibited cultivation in the 
border areas during the 1960s (INCB, 1967, 1971). Both realized that licensing would only 
work in areas in which the state presence was strong. Further, the level of violence in 
Himachal Pradesh and the border areas of Turkey was minimal in comparison to south-
eastern Afghanistan. One of the reasons for prohibition of the border areas of Turkey was due 
to the ease of movement of diverted opium across the border (Wishart, 1974). Further, up 
until the late 1970s, the Kurdish peoples who made up the majority of south-eastern poppy 
growing provinces of Urfa, Diyarbakir, Malatya, and Tuncel, had little economic integration 
with the state and tribal affiliations were significantly stronger than those to the state 
(Bozarslan, 2008). 
A major limitation to successful implementation concerns the fact that 98% of opium 
is grown in the least secure areas of Afghanistan. These areas border the major consumption 
and transhipment markets of Pakistan and Iran. Most of the poppy-growing districts are 
largely inaccessible to UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and are 
Windle, J. (2011). ‘Poppies for Medicine in Afghanistan: Historical Lessons from India and Turkey’. 
Journal of Asian and African Studies. Vol. 46(6), pp. 663-677. Pre-print copy. 
 
15 
 
under the authority of insurgents and/or organized criminal networks who have violently 
opposed eradication measures by the state in the past (UNODC, 2008). State criminal justice 
systems do not operate. In 2010, 7,120 casualties were reportedly a result of the Afghan 
insurgency; many were civilian targets employed by, or perceived to be supportive of, the 
state (US State Department, 2010).The potential to successfully implement a ‘poppies for 
medicine’ regime amid such high levels of conflict, in areas with minimal state control, is 
negligible. 
In the proposal, Shuras rather than farmers are licensed. If one member defaults, 
including not meeting a minimum yield, the entire community loses its license. The reasoning 
is that it will limit diversion by increasing the social controls that the Shuras have over those 
involved. The Bhattacharji case study of India is used to support this process as social 
controls are exerted in India at the village level: a village representative, or Lambardar, is 
used as the conduit between the state and the villagers (who are individually licensed). It is 
this person who attempts to limit diversion and monitors compliance with the control system. 
Two studies of India’s licit opium industry (Mansfield, 2001; Paoli et al., 2009), however, 
have critiqued the Lambardar system as being part of the problem. In interviews with Indian 
licit opium farmers it was reported that corrupt Lambardars take a percentage of illicit profits 
to ‘turn a blind eye’. Further, in many parts of Afghanistan Jirgas/Shuras are reportedly 
hijacked by representatives not of the people but of local insurgent/criminal groups (Wardak, 
2006). Thus, drawing from the experience of India, village level controls may not be the most 
appropriate control mechanisms. (While the punishment of an entire village for the transgres-
sions of a minority would hardly seem to equate to fair drug policy.) 
It is proposed that the ANP and village would be the primary barriers to ‘outside 
influence’ (i.e. insurgent/criminal groups). However, research has indicated that the ANP are 
notoriously corrupt. Also, that the Afghan National Army would train villagers as security 
guards could have two very serious repercussion. First, it would force villagers into conflicts 
with armed insurgent/criminal groups who would likely attempt to spoil the process through 
intimidation, acts of terrorism or theft of goods. Second, it could be looked upon as the 
creation of private militias, particularly if the state gave weapons to villagers employed for 
security purposes. 
An auxiliary police/militia force was armed by the state in Pashtun areas in 2006. The 
force was disbanded due to anger at perceptions of one ethnic group being disarmed amid 
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attempts to disarm other ethnic groups and reports of corruption and human rights abuses 
(Economist, 2008; Patel and Ross, 2007). It is not unlikely that similar problems would 
follow the creation of village-based private security forces. 
A summary of the perceived positives of the policy is given by the Senlis Council: 
Village-based ‘poppies for medicine’ projects would enable 
Afghanistan to defeat the illegal opium trade. Guaranteed to trigger 
economic development, ‘poppies for medicine’ projects would provide 
rural farming communities with access to the strategic assets necessary to 
diversify their economic activities and thus end their reliance on illegal 
poppy cultivation. ‘Poppies for medicine’ projects would not only allow for 
the controlled, sustainable phasing out of poppy cultivation, they would 
generate sufficient incentives for farming communities to cut links with 
drug traffickers. Interdiction and eradication would thereby be brought to a 
manageable level, by allowing distinctions to be made between the 
behaviour of those who cultivate poppy as a survival strategy, and the truly 
criminal behaviour of drug traffickers. (Senlis Council, 2007: 61) 
However, this appears to have several limitations. First, the licit trade would be able to 
support just a small percentage of opium farmers. In 2008–9, around 2.9 million Afghans 
were involved in the illicit trade compared to just 72,478 in the Indian licit trade (in the 
2005–6 season; Bhattacharji, 2007). If the size of the Afghan trade were to be equivalent to 
India’s then just 2.5% would be licensed to work licitly. It is not entirely clear what would 
happen to the 97.5% of Afghans currently in the opium trade other than that they would be 
subject to the ‘traditional’ policy tools of alternative development and/or law enforcement. 
Further, Afghanistan has a large, very poor, rural population. It is not inconceivable that if 
72,478 found work in the licit market, and no opium was diverted, then 72,478 Afghans in 
another area would be co-opted into growing opium. This replacement, driven by the price 
mechanism, would be similar to the replacement of low-cost drug mules who are arrested for 
trafficking. 
Second, that the licensing system would cut the link between traffickers and farmers is 
an unsupported assumption. Using India as a model, it is likely that between 10 and 50% will 
be diverted to illicit channels. It was estimated that in Turkey, prior to the ban, two-thirds was 
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diverted to illicit channels (Kayaalp, 2001). It has been suggested that 20% diversion from 
Afghanistan’s licit crop would be considerably better than the current 100% entering the 
black market (Bhattacharji and Kamminga, 2010; Leeson, 2008). While perhaps an attractive 
argument, this presumes that Afghan diversion would be closer to the estimated lower levels 
of Indian diversion. Due to the security and bureaucratic concerns highlighted earlier it is not 
unreasonable to anticipate diversion rates closer to the higher Indian or pre-ban Turkish 
estimates. 
One of the strongest arguments is that the process would build a reciprocal, trusting, 
relationship between the state and the peoples of licensed areas. However, this could be lost if 
licensed areas became targets of insurgents/criminal groups and, due to the high risk, the state 
and/or international development organizations backtracked on their commitments to the 
farmers. 
Conclusion 
The present study should not be interpreted as seeking to detract from the insightful research 
conducted by the Senlis Council, Jorrit Kamminga or Romesh Bhattacharji. It is the author’s 
hope that this critique is taken as a complement to work that is sufficiently well-prepared that 
it needs to be given serious consideration. Afghanistan needs such proposals if it is to move 
beyond its current impasse relating to the illicit opium and heroin trade. Yet, at the same 
time, the potentially major importance of such proposals for the future of Afghanistan means 
that it behoves us to subject them to scrutiny, and to draw upon the available evidence. 
Having sought and assessed such evidence, the conclusion of this paper is that ‘poppies for 
medicine’, as proposed by the Senlis Council in 2005, would not be to the benefit of 
Afghanistan or the international community, for the following key reasons: 
• A substantial percentage of the opium produced by licensed farmers for the 
state would be diverted to the black market; 
• State-licensed poppy farmers would be endangered; 
• It may not be the most effective means of development, nor illicit crop control, 
for Afghanistan. 
An example of the selective use of Indian and Turkish experiences in the proposals is 
the absence of the poppy straw method from the discussions on Turkey. The switch from 
opium gum to poppy straw production is the central element in Turkey’s development from 
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an illicit producer, with minimal regulations and high diversions, to a licit producer with 
stringent controls and minimal diversions. That the proposal would ignore this critical factor 
and largely base its licit opium control mechanisms on India, which has consistently 
experienced high levels of diversion, illustrates that the experiences of Turkey and India are 
selectively employed. 
An in-depth feasibility study on the potential effectiveness of the poppy straw method 
in Afghanistan would have strengthened the proposal. However, it is likely that an 
independent study would conclude that the expense of the machinery used to convert poppy 
straw to morphine would be prohibitive. The monitoring process to prevent diversion to illicit 
channels would remain an issue of concern as the poppy straw process still requires intensive 
monitoring by the state to prevent farmers from extracting opium gum. 
Another example of selective interpretation is that the Indian system licenses farmers 
on condition they meet the state imposed MQY, and rewards higher yields. The Senlis 
proposal requires the Shura to estimate expected yields, and there is no mention of the state 
imposing MQYs. This system appears to have a closer relationship to the ‘Opium Declaration 
System’ used, and highly criticized, as part of the regulatory weaknesses in Turkey before the 
opium ban. 
An additional neglected factor is that both Turkey and India implemented licit controls 
in areas under state authority, where transport, criminal justice and bureaucratic 
infrastructures were relatively efficient. The Afghan state system as a whole lacks the 
attributes necessary for a ‘poppies for medicine’ programme. The Senlis proposal implies an 
environment in which rural Afghans can choose between licit and illicit livelihoods. 
However, as illustrated by the examples of India and pre-ban Turkey, farmers will likely 
choose a mixture of the two economies, selling part to the state and diverting part to the black 
market. That both India and Turkey possessed significantly more advanced bureaucratic and 
criminal justice institutions, better transport infrastructures, greater authority and less 
violence would suggest that the share going to the black market would be as high, or higher, 
than reported in either Turkey or India. 
However, while the present conclusions may appear rather negative, they do not 
necessarily mean that a revised and improved version of ‘poppies for medicine’ could not be 
more appropriate for Afghanistan at some time in the future. Such a proposal could be re-
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considered if Afghanistan has made sufficient progress which, at minimum, would need to 
include: 
• Significantly improved and stable key institutions of governance including the 
criminal justice system, bureaucratic and transport infrastructure; 
• The writ of the state; that is, the rule of law has been extended with violence 
largely overcome in opium poppy-growing areas. 
In short, Afghanistan needs to become more secure and efficient, and this will almost 
certainly take many years. To introduce ‘poppies for medicine’ at any time in the near future 
would, the evidence suggests, be premature. 
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